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Abstract
This is a paper about private data analysis, in which a trusted curator holding a confidential
database responds to real vector-valued queries. A common approach to ensuring privacy for the
database elements is to add appropriately generated random noise to the answers, releasing only
these noisy responses. A line of study initiated in [DN03] examines the amount of distortion
needed to prevent privacy violations of various kinds. The results in the literature vary according
to several parameters, including the size of the database, the size of the universe from which
data elements are drawn, the “amount” of privacy desired, and for the purposes of the current
work, the arity of the query. In this paper we sharpen and unify these bounds. Our foremost
result combines the techniques of Hardt and Talwar [HT10] and McGregor et al. [MMP+10] to
obtain linear lower bounds on distortion when providing differential privacy for a (contrived)
class of low-sensitivity queries. (A query has low sensitivity if the data of a single individual
has small effect on the answer.) Several structural results follow as immediate corollaries:
• We separate so-called counting queries from arbitrary low-sensitivity queries, proving the
latter requires more noise, or distortion, than does the former;
• We separate (ε, 0)-differential privacy from its well-studied relaxation (ε, δ)-differential
privacy, even when δ ∈ 2−o(n) is negligible in the size n of the database, proving the latter
requires less distortion than the former;
• We demonstrate that (ε, δ)-differential privacy is much weaker than (ε, 0)-differential pri-
vacy in terms of mutual information of the transcript of the mechanism with the database,
even when δ ∈ 2−o(n) is negligible in the size n of the database.
We also simplify the lower bounds on noise for counting queries in [HT10] and also make them
unconditional. Further, we use a characterization of (ǫ, δ) differential privacy from [MMP+10]
to obtain lower bounds on the distortion needed to ensure (ε, δ)-differential privacy for ǫ, δ > 0.
Next, we revisit the LP decoding argument of [DMT07] and combine it with recent results
of Rudelson [Rud11] to show that for some specific η > 0, if the ℓ-way marginals are released
such that at least 1− ǫ fraction of the entries have o(√n) noise, then a very minimal notion of
privacy called attribute privacy is violated. This improves on a recent result of Kasiviswanathan
et al. [KRSU10] where the same conclusion was shown assuming that all the entries have o(
√
n)
noise.
Finally, we extend the original lower bound of [DN03] to prevent blatant non-privacy to the
case when the universe size is smaller than the size of the database. As we show, the lower
bound on the noise required to prevent blatant non-privacy becomes larger as the size of the
universe decreases.
Keywords: Differential privacy, LP decoding, Rademacher sums
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1 Introduction
This is a paper about private data analysis, in which a trusted curator holding a confidential
database responds to real vector-valued queries. Specifically, we focus on the practice of ensuring
privacy for the database elements by adding appropriately generated random noise to the answers,
releasing only these noisy responses. A line of study initiated by Dinur and Nissim examines the
amount of distortion needed to prevent privacy violations of various kinds [DN03]. Dinur and Nissim
did not have a definition of privacy; rather, they had a notion that has come to be called blatant
non-privacy; the modest goal, then, was to add enough distortion to avert blatant non-privacy.
Since that time, the community has raised the bar by definining (and achieving) powerful and
comprehensive notions of privacy [DN03, DMNS06, DKM+06], and the goal has been to preserve
(ε, 0)-differential privacy and its relaxation, (ε, δ)-differential privacy. A final goal considered herein,
attribute privacy, has a more complicated description, but may be thought of as preventing blatant
non-privacy for a single data attribute [KRSU10] in the presence of a certain kind of contingency
table query.
The results in the literature vary according to several parameters, including the number n of
elements in the database, the size d of the universe from which data elements are drawn, the
“amount” and type of privacy desired, and for the purposes of the current work, the arity k of the
query. In this paper we strengthen and unify these bounds.
As corollaries of our work, we obtain several “structural” results regarding different types of privacy
guarantees:
• We separate so-called counting queries from arbitrary low-sensitivity queries, proving the
latter requires more noise, or distortion, than does the former;
• We separate (ε, 0)-differential privacy from its well-studied relaxation (ε, δ)-differential pri-
vacy, even when δ ∈ 2−o(n) is negligible in the size n of the database, proving the latter
requires less distortion than the former;
• We demonstrate that (ε, δ)-differential privacy is much weaker than (ε, 0)-differential privacy
in terms of mutual information of the transcript of the mechanism with the database even
when δ ∈ 2−o(n) is negligible in the size n of the database.
We also simplify the lower bounds on noise for counting queries in [HT10] and also make them
unconditional removing a technical assumption on the mechanism present in their paper. Next, we
use a characterization of (ǫ, δ) differential privacy from [MMP+10] to obtain lower bounds on the
distortion needed to ensure (ε, δ)-differential privacy for ǫ, δ > 0. We remark that [KRSU10] also
obtain quantitatively similar lower bounds on the distortion required to maintain (ǫ, δ) differential
privacy for the class of ℓ-way marginals though their proof technique is very different and arguably
much more complicated.
After this, we use results of Rudelson [Rud11] and combine it with LP decoding to show that
attribute privacy is violated if ℓ-way marginals are released with at least 1 − η fraction of these
marginals are released with o(
√
n) noise for some η > 0. The results and the technique in [KRSU10]
required η = 0 making our results more powerful. Finally, we extend the results of [DN03] to the
case of small universe size achieving stronger lower bounds to prevent blatant non-privacy.
To describe our results even at a high level we must outline the privacy-preserving database model,
the notion of distortion or noise that may be employed in order to preserve privacy, and the meaning
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of the goals of the adversary: blatant non-privacy, violation of (ε, 0)-differential privacy, violation
of (ε, δ)- differential privacy, and attribute non-privacy.
Typically, the curator of a database receives questions to which it responds with potentially noisy
answers. There are two possible settings here. One is that the queries are received by the curator
one at a time. The other situation is that all the queries are received by the curator at once and it
then publishes (noisy) answers to all of them at once. The former is called the interactive setting
and the latter is called the non-interactive setting. All our lower bounds are in the non-interactive
setting making them applicable to the interactive setting as well.
We now formally describe a database and a query : A database X is an element of (Z+)d . Here d
is called the universe size and intuitively refers to the number of types of elements present in the
database. Also, for a database X, n =
∑d
i=1Xi is defined as the size of the database and refers to
the number of elements in the database. Note that we are representing databases as histograms. A
query (of arity k) is a map F : (Z+)d → Rk such that ∀i ∈ [k], ∀x, y ∈ (Z+)d, |F (x+y)i−F (x)i| ≤ 1
if ‖y‖1 = 1. In other words, every coordinate of the map F is 1-Lipschitz. We say F is a counting
query if F is a linear map. The meaning of d, k, n throughout the paper shall be the same as above
unless mentioned otherwise.
We now formally introduce the definition of mechanism and privacy.
Definition 1.1 Let F be a family of queries such that ∀F ∈ F , F : (Z+)d → Rk. Then, a
mechanism M : (Z+)d ×F → µ(Rk) where µ(Rk) is simply the set of probability distributions over
R
k. On being given a query F ∈ F and a database x ∈ (Z+)d, the curator samples z from the
probability distribution M(x, F ) and returns z.
We next state the definition of ǫ-differential privacy (introduced by Dwork et al. in [DMNS06]) and
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy (introduced by Dwork et al. in [DKM+06]).
Definition 1.2 For a family of queries F , a mechanism M : (Z+)d × F → µ(Rk) is said to be
ǫ-differentially private if for every x, y ∈ (Z+)d such that ‖x−y‖1 ≤ 1, every measurable set S ⊆ Rk
and ∀F ∈ F , the following holds : Let M(x, F ) =Mx,F and M(y, F ) =My,F and for a probability
distribution Γ, let Γ(S) denote the probability of set S under Γ. Then,
2−ǫ ≤ Mx,F (S)
My,F (S)
≤ 2ǫ
The mechanism is said to be (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if
2−ǫ ·My,F (S)− δ ≤Mx,F (S) ≤ 2ǫ ·My,F (S) + δ
Typically, δ is set to be negligible in n, k.
We remark that we do not define the notion of noise very precisely here as the notion of noise
depends on the context. However, in the context of differential privacy, we use the following
definition of noise.
Definition 1.3 For a family of queries F , a mechanism M : (Z+)d × F → µ(Rk) is said to
add noise (at most) η if with high probability (say 0.99) over the randomness of M , ‖M(x, F ) −
F (x)‖∞ ≤ η.
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While differential privacy is a very strong notion of privacy, sometimes one can show that even
very modest definitions of privacy get violated. One such notion is that of blatant non-privacy. We
say that a mechanism M for answering F over databases of size n and universe size d is blatantly
non-private, if there is an attack A such that w.h.p. over the answer y returned by the mechanism
M , A(y) differs from the database only at o(1) fraction of the places. Yet another very weak notion
of privacy that is interesting to us is that of attribute non-privacy. The formal definition follows :
Definition 1.4 For a query F ∈ F , a mechanism M : ({0, 1}d)n ×F → Rk is said to be attribute
non-private if there exists Y ∈ ({0, 1}d−1)n and an algorithm A such that for every x ∈ {0, 1}n,
P
z∈M(Y ◦x,F )
[A(z) = x′ : ‖x− x′‖1 = o(‖x‖1)] ≥ 1/10
where Y ◦ x simply denotes the obvious concatenation of Y and x. A need not be computationally
efficient and the constant 1/10 is arbitrary and can be replaced by any positive constant.
We show the following results :
1. Combining techniques from [HT10] and [MMP+10], we obtain tight lower bounds on the noise
for arbitrary (non-counting) low-sensitivity queries for any (ε, 0)-differentially private mecha-
nism. Given positive results of Blum, Ligett, and Roth [BLR08], this separates non-counting
queries from counting queries, proving that the former require more distortion than the latter
for maintaining differential privacy. Also, given the positive results of [DKM+06] for arbi-
trary low-sensitivity queries, this separates (ε, δ)-differential privacy from (ε, 0)-differential
privacy, where δ = δ(n, k) denotes a function negligible in its argument. We also use this
technique to show that the guarantees in terms of information content is drastically weaker
for an (ǫ, δ) differentially private protocol as compared to an ǫ-differentially private protocol.
Our technique also simplifies the volume-based lower bounds on noise for counting queries
in [HT10]. In addition, we also make the lower bounds unconditional. The lower bound
in [HT10] required the mechanism to be defined on “fractional” databases i.e., on (R+)d as
opposed to just (Z+)d while we do not have any such restrictions.
2. We give tight lower bounds on noise for ensuring (ε, δ)-differential privacy for δ > 0. This proof
relies on a lemma due to [MMP+10] showing that (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms yield
a certain kind of unpredictable source. On the other hand, any mechanism that is blatantly
non-private cannot yield an unpredictable source. Thus, if the noise is insufficient to prevent
blatant non-privacy then it cannot provide (ε, δ)-differential privacy. We subsequently use
the lower bounds of [DN03, DMT07] for preventing blatant non-privacy to get lower bounds
on the distortion for (ǫ, δ) differential privacy.
3. We revisit the LP decoding attack of Dwork, McSherry, and Talwar [DMT07], observing that
any linear query matrix yielding a Euclidean section suffices for the attack. The LP decoding
attack succeeds even if a certain constant fraction of the responses have wild noise. Armed
with the connection to Euclidean sections, and a recent result of Rudelson [Rud11] bound-
ing from below the least singular value of the Hadamard product of certain i.i.d. matrices,
we qualitatively strengthen a lower bound of Kasiviswanathan, Rudelson, Smith, and Ull-
man [KRSU10] on the noise needed to avert attribute non-privacy in ℓ-way marginals release
by making the attack resilient to a constant fraction of wild responses.
4. We show new lower bounds for blatant non-privacy for the case when the size of the universe
is smaller than the size of the database. In particular, we show that there is a counting
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query such that if the distortion added on at least 1/2+ η fraction of the answers is bounded
by o(n/
√
d) (for some η > 0), then there is an attack which recovers a database different
from the original database by o(n). Our analysis makes use of a result on large deviation of
Rademacher sums.
2 Lower bound by volume arguments
We now recall the volume based argument of Hardt and Talwar [HT10] to show lower bounds on
the noise required for ǫ differential privacy.
Theorem 2.1 Assume x1, . . . , x2s ∈ (Z+)d such that ∀i, ‖xi‖1 ≤ n and for i 6= j, ‖xi− xj‖1 ≤ ∆.
Further, let F : (Z+)
d → Rk such that for any i 6= j, ‖F (xi) − F (xj)‖∞ ≥ η. If ∆ ≤ (s − 1)/ǫ,
then any mechanism which is ǫ-differentially private for the query F on databases of size n must
add noise η/2.
While the line of reasoning in the proof is same as that of [HT10], we do the proof here as the
argument in [HT10] works only for counting queries i.e., when F is a linear transformation. On
the other hand, the statement and proof of our result works for any query F .
Proof: Consider the ℓ∞ balls of radius η/2 around each of the F (xi). By the hypothesis, these
balls are disjoint. Now assume, any mechanismM which adds noise η/2 and consider any xi. Then,
because all the balls are disjoint, we have that there is some j 6= i such that if S is the ℓ∞ ball of
radius η/2 around F (xj), then
P
z∈M(xi,F )
[z ∈ S] ≤ 2−s
However, we can also say that because the noise added by the mechanism M is at most η,
P
z∈M(xj ,F )
[z ∈ S] ≥ 1/2
Also, because the mechanism M is ǫ-differentially private and ‖xi − xj‖1 ≤ ∆, then
Pz∈M(xi,F )[z ∈ S]
Pz∈M(xj ,F )[z ∈ S]
≥ 2−ǫ·∆
This leads to a contradiction if ∆ ≤ (s− 1)/ǫ thus proving the assertion.
2.1 Linear lower bound for arbitrary queries
In this subsection, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 For any k, d, n ∈ N and 1/40 ≥ ǫ > 0, where n ≥ min{k/ǫ, d/ǫ}, there is a
query F : (Z+)d → Rk such that any mechanism M which is ǫ-differentially private adds noise
Ω(min{d/ǫ, k/ǫ}).
If ǫ > 1, then there is a query F : (Z+)d → Rk such that any mechanism M which is ǫ-differentially
private adds noise Ω(min{d/(ǫ · 25ǫ), k/ǫ}) as long as n ≥ min{k/ǫ, d/(ǫ · 25ǫ)}
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Before starting the proof, we make a couple of observations. First of all, note that the statement
of the theorem does not give any lower bound for 1 ≥ ǫ > 1/40. However, any mechanism which is
ǫ-differentially private for ǫ in the aforementioned range is also ǫ′-differentially private for ǫ′ = 10/9.
Hence, the noise lower bounds for ǫ′-differential privacy for ǫ′ = 10/9 are also applicable for the
range of 1 ≥ ǫ > 1/40. It is easy to see that up to constant factors, the lower bounds with ǫ′ = 10/9
are optimal for ǫ in the aforementioned range.
Secondly, we note that it is enough to add noise O(k/ǫ) to maintain ǫ-differential privacy (using
the Laplacian mechanism). Also, because the databases are of size n, it is enough to add noise
O(n) to maintain ǫ-differential privacy for any ǫ ≥ 0. Thus, as long as k = O(d), our lower bounds
are tight up to constant factors. Next, we do the proof of Theorem 2.2.
Proof: Our proof strategy is to construct a set of databases and a query which meets the
conditions stated in the hypothesis of Theorem 2.1 and then get the desired lower bound on the
noise. We first deal with the case when 0 < ǫ < 1/40. Let ℓ = min{d, k}. We can now use Claim A.2
to construct 2s databases x1, . . . , x2s (for s = ℓ/400) such that xi ∈ (Z+)d with the property that
∀i 6= j, ‖xi − xj‖1 ≥ n′/10 and ‖xi‖1 ≤ n′ where n′ = ℓ/(1280ǫ) (Application of Claim A.2 uses
d′ = ℓ/320). Note that our databases are of size bounded by n′ ≤ n. We now describe a mapping
L : (Z+)d → R2s which is related to a construction in [MMP+10]. The mapping is as follows :
• For every xi, there is a coordinate i in the mapping.
• The ith coordinate of L(z) is max{n′/30− ‖xi − z‖1, 0}.
Claim 2.3 The map L is 1-Lipschitz i.e., if ‖z1 − z2‖1 = 1, then ‖L(z1)− L(z2)‖1 ≤ 1.
Proof: We observe that for any z1, z2 such that ‖z1− z2‖ ≤ 1, if A denotes the set of coordinates
where at least one of L(z1) or L(z2) are non-zero, then A is either empty or is a singleton set.
Given this, the statement in the claim is obvious, since the mapping corresponding to any particular
coordinate is clearly 1-Lipschitz.
We now describe the queries. Corresponding to any r ∈ {−1, 1}2s , we define fr : (Z+)d → R, as
fr(x) =
d∑
i=1
L(x)i · ri
Now, we define a random map F : (Z+)d → Rk as follows. Pick r1, . . . , rk ∈ {−1, 1}2s independently
and uniformly at random and define F as follows :
F (x) = (fr1(x), . . . , frk(x))
Now consider any xh, xj ∈ S such that h 6= j. Because of the way L is defined, it is clear that for
any ri,
P
ri
[|fri(xh)− fri(xj)| ≥ n′/15] ≥ 1/2
A basic application of the Chernoff bound implies that
P
r1,...,rk
[For at least 1/10 of the ri’s, |fri(xh)− fri(xj)| ≥ n′/15] ≥ 1− 2−k/30
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Now, note that the total number of pairs (xi, xj) of databases such that xi, xj ∈ S is at most
22s ≤ 2ℓ/200 ≤ 2k/200. This implies (via a union bound)
P
r1,...,rk
[∀h 6= j, For at least 1/10 of the ri’s, |fri(xh)− fri(xj)| ≥ n′/15] ≥ 1− 2−k/40
This implies that we can fix r1, . . . , rk such that the following is true.
∀h 6= j, For at least 1/10 of the ri’s, |fri(xh)− fri(xj)| ≥ n′/15
This implies that for any xh 6= xj ∈ S, ‖F (xh) − F (xj)‖∞ ≥ n′/15. In fact, ‖F (xh) − F (xj)‖2 ≥
n′
√
k/150 which is a much stronger assumption than what we require and is quantitatively similar
to the results in [HT10] where they consider ℓ2 noise as opposed to ℓ∞ noise.
We can now apply Theorem 2.1 by putting ∆ = 2n′ and s = ℓ/400 > 3ǫn′ and η = n′/15 and
observe that ∆ ≤ (s− 1)/ǫ thus proving the result.
We next deal with the case when ǫ > 1. This part of the proof differs from the case when ǫ < 1
only in the construction of x1, . . . , x2s . We also emphasize that had we not insisted on integral
databases, our proof would have been identical to the first part. We construct the databases
x1, . . . , x2s using combinatorial designs. More precisely, for some sufficiently large constant C, let
ℓ = min{d/(C · 25ǫ), k}. We can now use Claim A.3 to construct 2s databases x1, . . . , x2s (for
s = ℓ/400) such that xi ∈ (Z+)d with the property that ∀i 6= j, ‖xi − xj‖1 ≥ n′/10 and ‖xi‖1 ≤ n′
where n′ = ℓ/(1280ǫ) (using d′ = ℓ/320 in Claim A.3). Again, we note here that the databases
constructed are of size n′.
From this point onwards, we define the map L and the query F as we did in the proof of Theorem 2.2
and the proof proceeds identically. In particular, we get a query F : (Z+)d → Rk such that for
any i 6= j, ‖F (xi) − F (xj)‖2 ≥ n′
√
k/150. As before, we can now apply Theorem 2.1 by putting
∆ = 2n′ and s = ℓ/100 > 3ǫn′ and η = n′/15 and observe that ∆ ≤ (s − 1)/ǫ thus proving the
result
For the subsequent part of this paper, we only consider lower bounds on ǫ-differential privacy for 0 <
ǫ < 1 as opposed to ǫ > 1. This is because the privacy guarantees one gets becomes unmeaningful
when ǫ is large. However, we do remark that the results can be carried in a straightforward way to
the regime of ǫ > 1 using combinatorial designs (like we did for Theorem 2.2).
Consequences of the linear lower bound
We briefly describe the two consequences of the linear lower bound on the noise proven in Theo-
rem 2.2. The first is separation of counting queries from non-counting queries. While our sepa-
ration gives quantitatively the same results as long as d = kO(1) and n = Θ(k/ǫ), for simplicity,
we consider the setting when k = d and n = k/ǫ. In this case, Theorem 2.2 shows existence of
a (non-counting) query such that maintaining ǫ-differential privacy requires noise Ω(n). On the
other hand, [BLR08] had proven that for any counting query with the same setting of parameters,
there is a mechanism which adds noise O˜(n2/3) and maintains ǫ-differential privacy. This shows
that maintaining ǫ-differential privacy inherently requires more distortion in case of non-counting
queries than counting queries.
The next consequence is a separation of (ǫ, δ) differential privacy from (ǫ, 0) differential privacy for
δ = 2−o(n). We note that Hardt and Talwar [HT10] had shown such a separation but that was
only when k = O(log n) and δ = n−O(1). Again, we use the setting of parameters when k = d and
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n = k/ǫ. The gaussian mechanism of [DKM+06] shows that to maintain (ǫ, δ) differential privacy
for any k queries, it sufficies to add noise O(
√
k log(1/δ)/ǫ) = o(n). However, Theorem 2.2 shows
that there is a query which requires adding noise Ω(n) to maintain (ǫ, 0) differential privacy.
The last consequence of our result is more indirect and is explained next.
2.2 Information loss in differentially private protocols
In [MMP+10], a connection was established between differentially private protocols and the notion
of mutual information from information theory. In fact, as [MMP+10] was dealing with 2-party
protocols, the connection was actually between differentially private protocols and that of infor-
mation content [BYJKS04, BBCR10] which is a symmetric variant of mutual information useful in
2-party protocols. In that paper, it was shown that the information content (which simplifies to
mutual information in our setting) between transcript of a ǫ-differentially private mechanism and
the database vector is bounded by O(ǫn). Using the construction used in the previous subsection,
we show that in case of (ǫ, δ) differentially private protocols (for any δ = 2−o(n)), there is no non-
trivial bound on the mutual information between the transcript of the mechanism and the database
vector. Thus as far as information theoretic guarantees go, the situation is drastically different for
pure differentially private protocols vis-a-vis approximately differentially private protocols. The
contents of this subsection are a result of personal communication between the author and Salil
Vadhan [DV10].
We first define the notion of mutual information (can be found in standard information theory
textbooks).
Definition 2.4 Given two random variables X and Y , their mutual information I(X;Y ) is defined
as
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
where H(X) denotes the Shannon entropy of X.
The next claim establishes an upper bound on the mutual information between transcript of a
differentially private protocol and the database vector.
Claim 2.5 Let F : (Z+)d → Rk be a query and M : (Z+)d → µ(Rk) be an ǫ-differentially private
protocol for answering F for databases of size n. If X is a distribution over the inputs in (Z+)d,
then I(M(X);X) ≤ 3ǫn.
Proof: We first note that since the databases are of size bounded by n, hence instead of assuming
that µ is a distribution over the inputs X ∈ (Z+)d, we can assume that µ is a distribution over
the inputs X ∈ [n]d where [n] = {0, 1, . . . , n}. Now, we can apply Proposition 7 from [MMP+10].
We note that the aforesaid proposition is in terms of information content for 2-party protocols
but we observe that we can simply make the second party’s input as a constant and get that
I(M(X);X) ≤ 3ǫn.
Next, we state the following claim which says that for (ǫ, δ) differentially private protocols, even
for an exponentially small δ, the mutual information between the transcript and the input can be
as large as n(1 − η) for any value of 0 < ǫ, η < 1. In other words, an (ǫ, δ) differentially private
protocol does not imply any effective bound on the mutual information between the input and the
transcript even as ǫ→ 0 and δ is exponentially small.
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Lemma 2.6 For n ∈ N and 0 < ǫ, η < 1, there is a constant C = C(ǫ, η) > 0 and a distribution
X over (Z+)n with a support over databases of size n and a query F : (Z+)n → Rk and an (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private protocol M for answering F such that I(X;M(X)) ≥ n(1−2η) if δ ≥ 2−C(ǫ,η)n.
Proof: We first construct 2s vectors in {0, 1}n (for s = n(1− η)) with the property that for any
xi, xj (i 6= j), ‖xi − xj‖1 ≥ η2n/8. It is easy to guarantee the existence of such a set of vectors
by a simple application of the probabilistic method. The distribution X is simply the uniform
distribution over the set {x1, . . . , x2s}. By construction, all the databases in X are of size bounded
by n.
Next, we define the query F : (Z+)n → Rk be defined in the same way as the query F in the proof
of Theorem 2.2. Following, exactly the same calculations, we can show that if we set k = 80n, we
get a query F : (Z+)n → Rk such that for any i 6= j, ‖F (xi)−F (xj)‖2 ≥ η2n
√
k/50. We now recall
the Gaussian mechanism of [DKM+06] which maintains (ǫ, δ) differential privacy.
Lemma 2.7 [DKM+06] Let F : (Z+)d → Rk be a query. Let Y = (Y1, . . . , Yk) be a distribution
over Rk such that each Yi is an i.i.d. N (0, σ) random variable. Here σ2 = k log(1/δ)ǫ2 . Then the
mechanism M which for a database x and query F , which samples Y0 from Y and responds by
F (x) + Y0 is an (ǫ, δ) differentially private mechanism.
Note that for the above mechanism M , and database x, if Z is sampled from M(x), then the
distribution of M(x) − F (x) is same as (Y1, . . . , Yk) where each Yi is an i.i.d. N (0, σ) random
variable. Thus,
‖M(x)− F (x)‖22 ∼ Y 21 + . . .+ Y 2k
As the following fact shows, the distribution on the right hand side is concentrated around its
mean. The fact is possibly well-known but we could not find a reference and hence we prove it in
Appendix C.
Fact 2.8 If Y1, . . . , Yk are i.i.d. N (0, σ) random variables, then,
P
Y1,...,Yk
[Y 21 + . . . + Y
2
k > 2(1 + ξ) · k · σ2] ≤ 2−
kξ
2
Using the above fact, we get
P
[
‖M(x) − F (x)‖22 >
2(1 + ξ)k2 log(1/δ)
ǫ2
]
≤ 2−ξk2
Here the probability is over the randomness of the mechanism. Putting ξ = 1 and δ = 2−C(ǫ,η)n for
an appropriate constant C(ǫ, η), we get that
P
[
‖M(x) − F (x)‖2 > η
2n
√
k
200
]
≤ 2−40n
As we know, for any i 6= j, ‖F (xi)−F (xj)‖2 ≥ η2n
√
k/50. Hence, with probability at least 1−2−n
over the randomness of the mechanism, for any database xi ∈ supp(X), if y is sampled fromM(xi),
∀j 6= i ‖F (xj)− y‖2 > ‖F (xi)− y‖2
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Thus, for any xi, given M(xi), we can recover xi with high probability and hence, we can say
P
y∼M(X)
[H(X|M(X) = y) = 0] > 1− 2−n
This means that
H(X|M(X)) ≤ 2−nn < 1
Recall that I(X;M(X)) = H(X) −H(X|M(X)) ≥ H(X) − 1 = (1 − η)n − 1 ≥ (1 − 2η)n. This
completes the proof of the Lemma 2.6.
3 Lower bound on noise for counting queries
In the last section, we proved that to preserve ǫ differential privacy for k queries, one may need
to add Ω(k/ǫ) noise provided d, n ≫ k. However, these queries were not counting queries. It is
interesting to derive lower bounds on noise required to preserve privacy for counting queries as
these are the queries mostly used in practice. While one might initially hope to prove a similar
lower bound for counting queries, [BLR08] states that there is a ǫ-differentially private mechanism
which adds O˜(n2/3/ǫ) noise per query and can answer O(n) counting queries (when d = nO(1)).
Still, Hardt and Talwar [HT10] showed that to answer k counting queries, any mechanism which
is ǫ-differentially private must add Ω(min{k/ǫ,√k log(d/k)/ǫ}) noise (in fact, this is true for k
random queries). However, [HT10] make a technical assumption that the mechanism has a smooth
extension which works for “fractional” databases as well. In other words, they require the domain
of the mechanism to be (R+)d as opposed to (Z+)d. However, it is not clear if this is always true i.e.,
if given a mechanism which is defined only over true (integral) databases, one can get a mechanism
which is defined over “fractional” databases with similar privacy guarantees.
Next, we prove the same result without making any such technical assumptions. Again, our con-
structions are dependent on combinatorial designs [Pau85]. First, we prove the following simple
but useful claim.
Claim 3.1 Let a ∈ Z and assume x1, x2, . . . , x2s ∈ (Z+)d such that ∀i, every entry of xi is either
0 or a. Also, for every i 6= ℓ, ‖xi − xℓ‖1 ≥ ∆. Then, for k ≥ 20s, there is a linear query
F : (Z+)d → Rk such that for every i, ℓ ∈ [2s] and i 6= ℓ, the following holds :
P
j∈[k]
[|F (xi)j − F (xℓ)j | ≥ ∆′/10] ≥ 1/40
where ∆′ =
√
∆ · a.
Proof: Consider any xi, xℓ such that i 6= ℓ. Note that, z defined as z = xi − xℓ is such that
all its entries are 0,±a and also that z has at least ∆/a or more non-zero entries. If we choose
r ∈ {−1, 1}d u.a.r., then note that
Y =
d∑
i=1
zi · ri =
∑
zi=±a
zi · ri
Note that the total number of summands is ℓ′ ≥ ∆/a and hence the distribution of the random
variable Y is same as choosing r′ ∈ {−1, 1}d and considering the random variable
Y ′ = a ·
(
ℓ′∑
i=1
r′i
)
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However using Corollary B.2, we get
P
[
|Y ′| ≥
√
∆ · a
10
]
= P
[
|
ℓ′∑
i=1
r′i| ≥
√
∆/a
10
]
≥ 9
10
(1)
Now, let us choose r′1, . . . , r
′
k uniformly and independently at random from {−1, 1}d and consider
the linear query F : (Z+)d → Rk defined as
F (x) =

 d∑
j=1
xj · r′1j , . . . ,
d∑
j=1
xj · r′kj


Set ∆′ =
√
∆ · a. Now, (1) and an application of Chernoff bound implies that for any xi, xℓ (i 6= ℓ)
P
r′1,...,r
′
k
[
P
j∈[k]
[|F (xi)j − F (xℓ)j | ≥ ∆′/10] ≥ 1/40
]
> 1− 2−k/10
We now observe that the total number of pairs (xi, xℓ) (i 6= ℓ) is at most 22s ≤ 2k/10. Applying a
union bound, we get that there is some choice of r′1, . . . , r
′
k (and hence a fixed F ) such that
P
j∈[k]
[|F (xi)j − F (xℓ)j | ≥ ∆′/10] ≥ 1/40
We now prove a lower bound on the noise required to maintain privacy for random counting
queries. As we have said before, Hardt and Talwar [HT10] proved the same result under an addi-
tional assumption that the mechanism defined over integral databases can be smoothly extended
to fractional databases as well.
Theorem 3.2 For every k, d ∈ N and 1 > ǫ > 0, there is a counting query F : (Z+)d → Rk such
that any mechanism which maintains ǫ-differential privacy adds noise Ω(min{k/ǫ,√k log(d/k)/ǫ}).
The size of the database i.e., n = O(k/ǫ).
Proof: The proof strategy is to come up with databases meeting the hypothesis of Claim 3.1
and use Claim 3.1 to get a counting query F . We then use Theorem 2.1 to get a lower bound on
the distortion required by any private mechanism to answer F . We consider two cases : k ≤ log d
and k > log d.
The first case is trivial : Namely, consider databases x1, . . . , x2k/20 such that each xi = ⌊(k/80ǫ)⌋·ei
where ei is the standard unit vector in the i
th direction. This is possible as there are d ≥ 2k different
unit vectors. Note that for any i 6= ℓ, ‖xi − xℓ‖1 = 2 · ⌊k/(80ǫ)⌋. We can now apply Claim 3.1 and
get that there is a linear query F : (Z+)d → Rk (using ∆ = 2 · ⌊k/(80ǫ)⌋ and a = ⌊k/(80ǫ)⌋) such
that
P
j∈[k]
[
|F (xi)j − F (xℓ)j | ≥
√
2
10
⌊k/(80ǫ)⌋ ≥ k
800ǫ
]
≥ 1/40
We see that there are 2k/20 = 2s databases which differ by exactly 2 · ⌊k/(80ǫ)⌋ = ∆. Note that
∆ ≤ (s−1)/ǫ. Hence we can apply Theorem 2.1 to note that to maintain ǫ-differential privacy, any
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mechanism needs to add k/(800ǫ) noise. In fact, we note that the ℓ2 error of the answer returned
by the mechanism needs to be Ω(k3/2/ǫ) which is quantitatively the same as the result in [HT10].
The second case is slightly more complicated. We use Claim A.1 to construct x1, . . . , x2k/20 ∈ (Z+)d
with the following properties :
• Every entry of any of the xi’s is either 0 or a ∈ Z such that a ≥ (log(d/k)/160ǫ).
• ∀i, ‖xi‖1 ≤ k/80ǫ and ∀i 6= j, ‖xi − xj‖1 ≥ k/160ǫ
Again, we can apply Claim 3.1 and get that there is a linear query F : (Z+)d → Rk (using
∆ ≥ k/(160ǫ) and a ≥ (log(d/k)/160ǫ)) such that ∀i 6= ℓ
P
j∈[k]
[
|F (xi)j − F (xℓ)j | ≥ 1
10
·
√
k log(d/k)
160ǫ
]
≥ 1/40
Again, we have 2k/20 databases which differ by at most k/(40ǫ) and hence we can apply Theorem 2.1
to get that to maintain ǫ-differential privacy, any mechanism needs to add Ω
(√
k log(d/k)
ǫ
)
noise.
4 Lower bounds for approximate differential privacy
In this section, we prove lower bounds on the noise required to maintain (ǫ, δ) differential privacy
for ǫ, δ > 0. Our lower bounds are valid for any positive δ > 0 and are in fact tight for a constant
ǫ and δ. We note that a quantitatively similar lower bound was proven for the class of ℓ-way
marginals by [KRSU10] though our proof (for random queries) is arguably much simpler.
In this section, we consider databases which are elements of {0, 1}n or in other words we consider
the case when the universe size d = n and the databases are allowed to have exactly one element of
each type. We note that restricting databases to bit vectors is a well-considered model in literature
including [DN03, DMT07, MMP+10] among others.
We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 For any n ∈ N, ǫ > 0 and 1/20 > δ > 0, there exist positive constants α, γ and η
such that there is a counting query F : {0, 1}n → Rk with k = αn such that any mechanism M that
satisfies
P
M
[ P
i∈[k]
[|M(x, F )i − F (x)i| ≤ η
√
n] ≥ 1/2 + γ] ≥ 3
√
δ
is not (ǫ, δ) differentially private. In other words, any mechanism M which with significant prob-
ability i.e., 3
√
δ answers at least 1/2 + γ fraction of the k queries with at most η
√
n noise, is not
(ǫ, δ) differentially private.
An immediate corollary is that there exists a positive constant α and a counting query F : {0, 1}n →
R
k where k = αn such that any mechanism which adds o(
√
n) noise is not (ǫ, δ) differentially private
for ǫ > 0 and δ < 1/20.
To do the proof of Theorem 4.1, we first need to introduce some definitions previously discussed
in [MMP+10]. We do note that the paper [MMP+10] deals with the two-party setting but the
relevant definitions and the lemma we use here easily extend to the standard (curator-client) setting
of privacy.
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Definition 4.2 A random variable Y ∈ {0, 1}n is said to be δ-approximate strongly α-unpredictable
bit source (for α ≥ 1) if with probability 1− δ over i ∈ [n] and (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi, yi+1, . . . , yn)← Y
1
α
≤ P[Yi = 1|Y1 = y1, . . . , Yi−1 = yi−1, Yi+1 = yi+1, . . . , Yn = yn]
P[Yi = 0|Y1 = y1, . . . , Yi−1 = yi−1, Yi+1 = yi+1, . . . , Yn = yn] ≤ α
The next lemma (proven in [MMP+10] for the two-party setting) roughly says that for any (ǫ, δ)
private mechanism, conditioned on the transcript of the mechanism, the distribution of the database
is a δ-approximate strong 2ǫ-unpredictable source. More precisely, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3 Let F : {0, 1}n → Rk be a query and M be a (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mechanism for
answering F . Let X be the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n and Γ be the probability distribution
over the transcripts of M(x) when x is drawn from X. Then for any µ > 0 and t ← Γ, the
distribution X|Γ=t is δt approximate strongly 2ǫ+µ-unpredictable sources such that
E
t∈Γ
[δt] ≤ 2δ · 1 + e
−ǫ−µ
1− e−µ
.
The above lemma trivially follows from Lemma 20 of [MMP+10] (full version) and hence we do not
prove it here. Before, proving Theorem 4.1, we need to recall the following theorem from [DMT07]
(Theorem 24 in the paper).
Theorem 4.4 For any γ > 0 and any ν = ν(n), there is a constant α = α(γ) > 0 such that for
k = αn, there is a counting query F : {0, 1}n → Rk and an algorithm A such that given y˜ which
satisfies
P
i∈[k]
[|y˜i − F (x)i| ≤ ν] ≥ 1
2
+ γ
the output of A on y˜ i.e., A(y˜) = x′ such that x′ ∈ {0, 1}n and ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 4ν2γ2
The following corollary follows immediately from Theorem 4.4.
Corollary 4.5 For any δ′ > 0, there are positive constants γ = γ(δ′), η = η(δ′), α = α(δ′) such
that for k = αn, there is a counting query F : {0, 1}n → Rk and an algorithm A such that given y˜
which satisfies
P
i∈[k]
[|y˜i − F (x)i| ≤ η
√
n] ≥ 1
2
+ γ
the output of A on y˜ i.e., A(y˜) = x′ such that x′ ∈ {0, 1}n and ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ δ′n.
We now prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof: [of Theorem 4.1]
Let X denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n. First, using Lemma 4.3, we get that over the
randomness of the mechanismM and the choice of x ∈ X, if we sample a transcript t fromM(x, F ),
then for any positive µ, the distribution X|M(x,F )=t is a δt-approximate strongly 2ǫ+µ-unpredictable
sources where δt satisfies
E
t∈M(x,F )
[δt] ≤ 2δ · 1 + e
−ǫ−µ
1− e−µ
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. Clearly, we can put µ = 10 and get that the distribution X|M(x,F )=t is a δt-approximate strongly
2ǫ+10-unpredictable sources where Et∈M(x,F ) [δt] ≤ 3δ. By an application of Markov’s inequality,
we get that with probability 1 − 2√δ over the choice of x and the randomness of the mechanism
M , the distribution X|M(x,F )=t is 2
√
δ-approximate strongly 2ǫ+10-unpredictable source.
We now apply corollary 4.5. In particular, we put δ′ =
√
δ and get that for some positive γ, η, α
(which are functions of δ′ and hence δ), there is a counting query F : {0, 1}n → Rαn and an
algorithm A such that given y˜ which satisfies
P
i∈[k]
[|y˜i − F (x)i| ≤ η
√
n] ≥ 1
2
+ γ
the output of A on y˜ i.e., A(y˜) = x′ such that x′ ∈ {0, 1}n and ‖x− x′‖1 ≤
√
δ · n. Now, consider
a mechanism M which satisfies
P
M
[ P
i∈[k]
[|M(x, F )i − F (x)i| ≤ η
√
n] ≥ 1/2 + γ] ≥ β
for β = 3
√
δ. Clearly such a mechanismM is not (ǫ, δ) differentially private because with probability
at least β = 3
√
δ, the algorithm A will be able to predict at least 1−√δ fraction of the positions
which contradicts that with probability 1−2√δ, the distribution X|M(x,F )=t is a 2
√
δ -approximate
strongly 2ǫ+10-unpredictable source.
5 LP decoding, Euclidean sections and hardness of releasing ℓ-way
marginals
In this section, we consider attacks on privacy using linear programming. In particular, we use the
technique of LP decoding (previously used in [DMT07] in context of privacy) to give attacks which
violate even minimal notions of privacy when 1 − ǫ0 (for some ǫ0 > 0) fraction of the queries are
released with insufficient noise. We do this by establishing a connection between Euclidean sections
and use of LP decoding in context of privacy which does not seem to have explicitly appeared in the
literature before. We remark that the relation between LP decoding and Euclidean spaces is very
well known in context of compressed sensing [CRTV05]. However, in case of privacy, the adversary
is allowed to add small error to say 99% of the entries and arbitrary error to the remaining 1%
of the entries. In context of compressed sensing however, the adversary is allowed to add error to
only 1% of the entries.
We first describe how to use linear programming in context of privacy. Assume x ∈ Z+d is a
database and A : Rd → Rk is a linear map which represents a counting query with arity k made
on the database x. Further, the right set of answers is given by y = A · x. (To make sure that
the queries are 1-Lipschitz, all the entries of A come from [−1, 1].) Suppose, y˜ ∈ Rk is the answer
returned by the mechanism. Then, consider the following optimization problem (which can be
written as a linear program) :
Minimize ‖y − y˜‖1 subject to y = A · x˜ (2)
We would like to understand the conditions such that the solution to the above linear program, call
it x˜, is such that ‖x− x˜‖1 is small. To state our main theorem, we need to first define a Euclidean
section and list some of its basic properties.
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Definition 5.1 V ⊆ Rk is said to be a (δ, d, k) euclidean section if V is a linear subspace of
dimension d and for every x ∈ V , the following holds:
√
k‖x‖2 ≥ ‖x‖1 ≥ δ
√
k‖x‖2
A linear operator A : Rd → Rk is said to be δ-Euclidean if the range of A is a euclidean (δ, d, k)
section. We also note that because of Jensen’s inequality,
√
k‖x‖2 ≥ ‖x‖1 holds trivially.
We remark that when we say a subspace A ⊂ Rk is Euclidean, we simply mean that there is some
constant δ > 0 such that A is (δ,dim(A), k) Euclidean. The next claim states a useful fact about
Euclidean sections. We also introduce the following notation. For any ℓp norm defined on R
k and
any S ⊆ [k] and x ∈ Rk, ‖x‖S,p denotes the ℓp norm of the vector xS where xS is the projection of
x on the subset S.
Claim 5.2 Let V ⊆ Rk be a (δ, d, k) Euclidean section. Then for every 0 < δ′ < δ2/4, S ⊆ [k]
such that |S| ≤ δ′ · k and x ∈ V
‖x‖1 − 2 · ‖x‖S,1 ≥ β
√
k‖x‖2
where β = δ − 2√δ′.
Proof: Let S ⊆ [k] and |S| ≤ δ′ · k. Then, by Jensen’s inequality, we can say that
‖x‖S,1 ≤
√
|S| · ‖x‖S,2 ≤
√
|S| · ‖x‖2
This implies that
‖x‖1 − 2‖x‖S,1 ≥ ‖x‖1 − 2
√
|S| · ‖x‖2 ≥ (δ − 2
√
δ′)
√
k‖x‖2
We get the stated result by putting β = δ − 2√δ′.
Correctness of the LP decoding
We next state a theorem which roughly says the following : Assume A is a linear map whose range
is a Euclidean section and all the singular values of A are at least σ. Also, let F : (Z+)d → Rk be
the query corresponding to the linear map defined by A (with k = Θ(d)). Then, given noisy values
of A · x where the noise is such that but for some (fixed) positive fraction of the coordinates, all
other coordinates are within α = o(σ) of the correct value, the linear program (2) gives x˜ such that
‖x− x˜‖1 ≪ d.
Theorem 5.3 Let A : Rd → Rk be a full rank linear map (k > d) and all the singular values of
A are at least σ. Further, the range of A (denoted by L(A)) is a (δ, d, k) Euclidean section. Let
F : (Z+)d → Rk the query corresponding to A. Then, there exists γ = γ(δ) such that if
P
i∈[k]
[|F (x)i − y˜i| ≤ α] ≥ 1− γ
then, any solution x˜ to the linear program (2) satisfies ‖x˜− x‖1 ≤ O(α
√
kd/σ) where the constant
inside the O(·) notation depends on δ.
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Proof: First of all, using Claim 5.2, we get that for any S ⊆ [k] such that |S| ≤ δ2k/8 and z ∈ Rd
‖A · z‖1 − 2‖A · z‖S,1 ≥ (δ − 2
√
δ′)
√
k‖A · z‖2 ≥ δ
√
k
4
‖A · z‖2 ≥ δσ
√
k
4
‖z‖2 (3)
The last inequality uses that the singular value of A is at least σ. Now, assume that x˜ is the
solution to the linear program (2). Also, assume that y˜ = A · x+ e. Set γ = δ2/8 and then given
the assumption on the noise, e satisfies
P
i∈[k]
[|ei| > α] ≤ δ2/8
Also, let x˜ = x+ z. The next few steps are identical to [DMT07] but we do it here for the sake of
completeness. Since, x˜ is the solution to the linear program, we get
‖A · x− y˜‖1 ≥ ‖A · x˜− y˜‖1
‖A · x− y˜‖1 ≥ ‖A · (x˜− x) +A · x− y˜‖1
‖e‖1 ≥ ‖A · z − e‖1
Let S = {i : |ei| > α}. Then, from the above, we get that
‖e‖S,1 + ‖e‖S,1 ≥ ‖A · z − e‖S,1 + ‖A · z − e‖S,1 ≥ ‖e‖S,1 − ‖A · z‖S,1 + ‖A · z − e‖S,1
We next use ‖A · z − e‖S,1 ≥ ‖A · z‖S,1 − ‖e‖S,1 on the right hand side of the above inequality to
simplify and get
‖e‖S,1 ≥ ‖A · z‖S,1 − ‖e‖S,1 − ‖A · z‖S,1
‖A · z‖1 − 2 · ‖A · z‖S,1 ≤ 2‖e‖S,1
‖A · z‖1 − 2 · ‖A · z‖S,1 ≤ 2α|S|
‖A · z‖1 − 2‖A · z‖S,1 ≤ 2α(1 − δ2/8)k
Combining the above with (3), we get that
‖z‖2 ≤ 8α(1 − δ
2/8)
√
k
δσ
⇒ ‖z‖1 ≤ 8α(1 − δ
2/8)
√
kd
δσ
= O
(
α
√
kd
σ
)
5.1 Releasing ℓ-way marginals privately
We now formally define the problem of releasing ℓ-way marginals. The universe X is of the form
{−1, 1}d′ and we have a counting query F : (Z+)d → (R)k where k = (d′ℓ ) · 2ℓ and d = 2d′ . For any
x ∈ (Z+)d, each coordinate of x is identified with an element of {−1, 1}d′ . Note that [d′] can be
identified with a set of d′ binary attributes and any z ∈ {−1, 1}d′ denotes a specific setting of the
attributes. Hence, for x ∈ (Z+)d, the row associated with z ∈ {−1, 1}d′ counts how many elements
have that specific setting of the d′ attributes.
Similarly, consider any c ∈ {−1, 0, 1}d′ and define |c| =∑d′j=1 |ci| i.e., |c| represents the number of
non-zero entries in c. We note that the set S defined as
S = {c : c ∈ {−1, 0, 1}d′ and |c| = ℓ}
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has size 2ℓ · (d′ℓ ) = k. Thus, every c ∈ S can be identified with some specific setting of a specific
set of ℓ among the d′ attributes. Hence, we identify the set S with [k] and for any y ∈ Rk, every
coordinate of y is identified with some specific c ∈ S. We now define F . Consider a database x and
a row corresponding to c. Let Z be the set of ℓ attributes and ∆ be their setting corresponding to
c. Then the row of F (x) corresponding to c simply counts the number of elements in x where the
attributes in Z are indeed set to ∆. We now define F more formally.
Now, for any c ∈ {−1, 0, 1}d′ and z ∈ {−1, 1}d′ , we define Fc(z) as follows :
Fc(z) =
∏
j:cj=1
(
1 + zj
2
) ∏
j:cj=−1
(
1− zj
2
)
In other words, Fc(z) is 1 iff the following holds for every j : If cj = 1, then zj = 1 and if cj = −1,
then zj = −1.
We now define the counting query F : (Z+)d → (R)k as
F (x) =

 ∑
z∈{−1,1}d′
F1(z),
∑
z∈{−1,1}d′
F2(z), . . . ,
∑
z∈{−1,1}d′
Fk(z)


We now state our main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.4 Let q, ℓ ∈ N be constant integers. Then, there exists a constant γ = γ(q, ℓ) > 0 such
that any mechanism which releases the ℓ-way marginals of a table of size n over d′ attributes and
n ≤ d′ℓ−1 log(q) n by adding at most η noise to 1− γ fraction of the queries where
η = o(
√
n)
is attribute non-private. Further, the algorithm which violates attribute privacy is efficient and uses
LP decoding.
Here log(q) n is an iterated logarithm which is defined precisely later on. However, we wanted to
state the main result of this section in the beginning itself before diving into the proof structure.
In order to go into the proof structure, we first state the following theorem due to Kasiviswanathan
et al. [KRSU10] which is a weaker version of our result. We state their result only for the case
when d′ℓ−1 ≫ n · log2ℓ−4 n because our subsequent improvements are valid (and possible) only in
the regime of d′ℓ−1 ≫ n.
Theorem 5.5 [KRSU10] Let ℓ ∈ N be a constant and n, d ∈ N such that d′ℓ−1 ≫ n · log2ℓ−4 n.
Then, for every mechanism M which releases ℓ-way marginals of a database of size n (and universe
{0, 1}d′) such that the noise for every single query is bounded by η where
η ≪
√
n
logℓ
2−ℓ+1 n
is attribute non-private. In fact, the attack is an efficient algorithm based on ℓ2 norm minimization.
Before, we glimpse into how they prove their result and our improvement on that, we need to
describe the Hadamard product of matrices.
16
Definition 5.6 Let A1, . . . , As ∈ Rℓi×n. Then, the Hadamard product of A1, . . . , As is denoted by
A = A1 ◦ A2 . . . ◦ As ∈ RL×n where L = ℓ1 · . . . · ℓs and is defined as follows : Every row of A is
identified with a unique element of [ℓ1]× . . . × [ℓs]. Also corresponding to i = (i1, . . . , is),
A[i, k] =
s∏
j=1
Aj [ij , k]
where A[i, k] represents the element in row i and column k.
The attack in [KRSU10] is an efficient algorithm (is simply matrix inversion) and is basically
dependent on showing existence of a Hadamard product of small matrices such that all its singular
values are large. In particular, they show the following reduction.
Lemma 5.7 Let A1, . . . , Aℓ−1 ∈ Rd′×n such that A = A1 ◦A2 . . . ◦Aℓ−1 (with d′ℓ−1 > n) such that
all singular values of A are at least σ. Further, all entries of A1, . . . , Aℓ−1 are in the set {0, 1}.
Then, any mechanism M which adds ≪ (√n ·σ)/(
√
d′ℓ−1) noise to every coordinate while releasing
all the ℓ-way marginals of a table of size n with d′ attributes, is attribute non-private.
Subsequently, to prove Theorem 5.5, they proved the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8 Let D ∼ Rd′×n be a distribution over matrices such that every entry of the matrix is
an independent and unbiased {0, 1} random variable. Let A1, . . . , Aℓ−1 be i.i.d. copies of random
matrices drawn from the distribution D and A be the Hadamard product of A1, . . . , Aℓ−1. Then,
provided that d′ℓ−1 ≫ n · log2ℓ−4 n, with probability 1−o(1), the smallest singular value of A denoted
by σn(A) satisfies
σn(A) ≥
√
d′ℓ−1
logℓ
2−ℓ+1 n
This lemma clearly sufficed to prove Theorem 5.5. One of the main avenues of improvement in the
result in [KRSU10] is that because the attack is matrix inversion (or in other words, ℓ2 distance
minimization), it is inherently a noise sensitive method. In other words, it is not evident from the
result in [KRSU10] that even if 1 of the ℓ-way marginals is answered with arbitrary noise, if there is
still an attack which can violate attribute privacy. In this respect, LP decoding seems like a much
more powerful method and is usually robust even if a fraction of the queries are answered with wild
noise. In particular, we can combine the technique in proof of Theorem 5.3 and Lemma 5.7 to get
the following lemma (We do not prove it here because it is a straightforward combination of the
two techniques).
Lemma 5.9 Let A1, . . . , Aℓ−1 ∈ Rd′×n such that A = A1 ◦ A2 . . . ◦ Aℓ−1 (with d′ℓ−1 > n) and
all entries of A1, . . . , Aℓ−1 are in the set {0, 1}. Also, all the singular values of A are at least σ
and the range of A i.e., L(A) is a (δ, n, d′ℓ−1) Euclidean section. Then, there exists a constant
γ = γ(δ) > 0 such that any mechanism which answers at least 1−γ fraction of the ℓ-way marginals
with noise bounded by α is attribute non-private provided α
√
dℓ′−1·n
σ = o(n) or in other words,
α = o(
√
nσ/
√
dℓ′−1)
To describe the main technical result of Rudelson [Rud11], we need to define iterated logarithms.
Definition 5.10 For r ∈ N, we define log(r) n as follows :
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• log(1) n = max{log2 n, 1}
• log(r) n = log(1) (log(r−1) n)
Theorem 5.11 [Rud11] Let q, ℓ ∈ N be constants. Also, let D ∼ Rd′×n be a distribution over
matrices such that every entry of the matrix is an independent and unbiased {0, 1} random variable.
Let A1, . . . , Aℓ−1 be i.i.d. copies of random matrices drawn from the distribution D and A be the
Hadamard product of A1, . . . , Aℓ−1. Then, provided that d′ℓ−1 ≫ n log(q) n, with probability 1−o(1),
the smallest singular value of A denoted by σn(A) satisfies
σn(A) = Ω(
√
d′ℓ−1)
Also, the range of A is a (n, d′ℓ−1, γ(q, ℓ)) Euclidean section for some γ(q, ℓ) > 0.
Theorem 5.11 and Lemma 5.9 immediate imply our main theorem which we restate here for con-
venience.
Theorem 5.12 Let q, ℓ ∈ N be constant integers. Then, there exists a constant γ = γ(q, ℓ) > 0
such that any mechanism which releases the ℓ-way marginals of a table of size n over d′ attributes
and n ≤ d′ℓ−1 log(q) n by adding at most η noise to 1− γ fraction of the queries where
η = o(
√
n)
is attribute non-private. Further, the algorithm which violates attribute privacy is efficient and uses
LP decoding.
6 Noise lower bounds for blatant non-privacy
In this section, we prove lower bounds on the noise required to prevent blatant non-privacy while
answering random counting queries. Dinur and Nissim [DN03], in their seminal paper, had shown
that answering O(n log2 n) subset sum queries with o(
√
n) noise results in blatant non-privacy. In
other words, they had proven the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1 [DN03] For every n ∈ N, there is a counting query F : {0, 1}n → Rk for k =
O(n log2 n) and an algorithm A such that if M(x, F ) is the answer returned by the mechanism for
the database x and query F and
∀i |M(x, F )i − F (x)i| = o(
√
n)
then
A(M(x, F )) = x′ : ‖x− x′‖1 = o(n)
The algorithm A in the above result is efficient and uses linear programming. Since then, several
improvements were made to this result including the results in [DMT07] where the same conclusion
was achieved under the weaker hypothesis that
P
i∈[k]
[|M(x, F )i − F (x)i| = o(
√
n)] ≥ 1/2 + η
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for any η > 0. While the attack was inefficient, they also showed how to use LP decoding to get
an efficient attack and they could achieve this under the weaker hypothesis
P
i∈[k]
[|M(x, F )i − F (x)i| = o(
√
n)] ≥ 0.761
Further, in the results in [DMT07], the domain of the database was Rn as opposed to {0, 1}n.
However, all these results achieved blatant non-privacy when the size of the universe was same as
the size of the database namely n. In this section, we consider the modified setting where the size
of the universe is smaller than size of the database. As the next theorem shows, when the universe
size is smaller, the noise required to prevent blatant non-privacy is much larger.
Theorem 6.2 For every n, d ∈ N and η > 0, there is an algorithm A and a counting query
F : (Z+)d → Rk with k = 8(d · log n)/η2 such that if M(x, F ) is the answer returned by the
mechanism and
P
i
[|M(x, F )i − F (x)i| = o
(
n√
d
)
] ≥ 1/2 + η
then,
A(M(x, F )) = x′ : ‖x− x′‖1 = o(n)
Similarly, for every n, d ∈ N and θ = θ(n, d) ∈ R+ ≤ n, there is an algorithm B and a counting
query F : (Z+)d → Rk with k = 2d log n · exp
(
2dθ2
n2
)
such that if M(x, F ) is the answer returned
by the mechanism and
∀i [|M(x, F )i − F (x)i| = o(θ)]
then,
B(M(x, F )) = x′ : ‖x− x′‖1 = o(n)
Before going ahead with the proof, we remark that while both the algorithms A and B, as described
in the proof are inefficient, the former can be made efficient using linear programming (along the
lines of [DN03, DMT07]). We choose not to do it for the sake if simplicity.
Proof: The algorithm A is as follows :
• Enumerate over all x′ ∈ (Z+)d such that ‖x‖1 ≤ n.
• Return x′ if Pi[|M(x′, F )i − F (x)i| = o
(
n√
d
)
] ≥ 1/2 + η/4
It is clear that the algorithm returns an answer as x′ = x satisfies the second condition. Now,
consider any c > 0 and x′ and x which differ by cn. Then, choose r1, . . . , rk ∈ {−1, 1}n uniformly
at random and let us define the linear query F : (Z+)d → Rk as follows :
F (x) = (
d∑
j=1
xj · r1j , . . . ,
d∑
j=1
xj · rkj)
Now, consider Fℓ(x)−Fℓ(x′) =
∑d
j=1(xj −x′j) · rℓj =
∑d
j=1 zj · rℓk where z = x−x′ with ‖z‖1 ≥ cn.
Then, by Theorem B.1, ∃c′ = c′(c, η) such that
P
rℓ∈{−1,1}d

| d∑
j=1
(xj − x′j) · rℓj | ≤
c′n√
d

 ≤ η/100
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Let us define the set S =
{
ℓ : |∑dj=1(xj − x′j) · rℓj| ≥ c′n√d
}
. Then a Chernoff bound implies that
P
r1,...,rk
[|S| > (η · k)/4] ≤ 1− exp(−η2k/4) (4)
Putting k = 8
η2
· d · log n, we get that the probability is strictly bounded by n−2d. Note that the
total number of pairs x, x′ ∈ (Z+)d such that ‖x‖1, ‖x′‖1 ≤ n is bounded by n2d. Thus applying
the union bound with (4), we get that we can fix r1, . . . , rk and get F : (Z
+)d → Rk such that if
x, x′ ∈ (Z+)d, ‖x‖1 ≤ n, ‖x′‖1 ≤ n and ‖x− x′‖1 ≥ cn, then
P
i∈[k]
[
|F (x)i − F (x′)i| ≥ (c
′n)√
d
]
> 1− η/4
Using the hypothesis i.e.,
P
i
[
|M(x, F )i − F (x)i| = o
(
n√
d
)]
≥ 1/2 + η
we get that for all x′ such that ‖x− x′‖1 ≥ cn,
P
i
[
|M(x, F )i − F (x′)i| = o
(
n√
d
)]
< 1/2 + η/4
Thus, when we have the query F described above, the algorithm A will never return x′ if ‖x−x′‖1 ≥
cn and hence the correctness is proven.
We now come to the second part of the theorem. The algorithm B is described as follows :
• Enumerate over all x′ ∈ (Z+)d such that ‖x‖1 ≤ n.
• Return x′ if ∀i, [|M(x′, F )i − F (x)i| = o(θ)
Again, first of all, we observe the algorithm B always returns an answer as x′ = x satisfies the
second condition. To prove the second part of the result, we define F : (Z+)d → Rk exactly in
the same way that we did earlier. Now, consider any ℓ ∈ [k]. Now, consider Fℓ(x) − Fℓ(x′) =∑d
j=1(xj − x′j) · rℓj =
∑d
j=1 zj · rℓk where z = x− x′ with ‖z‖1 ≥ cn. Then, by Theorem B.1,
P
rℓ∈{−1,1}d

| d∑
j=1
(xj − x′j) · rℓj | ≥ c · θ

 ≥ exp(2dθ2
n2
)
This means that putting k = exp
(
2dθ2
n2
)
· 2d log n
P
r1,...,rk∈{−1,1}d

∃ℓ ∈ [k] : | d∑
j=1
(xj − x′j) · rℓj | ≥ c · θ

 > 1− n−2d
As before, by a union bound, we can fix r1, . . . , rk and get a query F : (Z
+)d → Rk such that for
any x, x′ ∈ (Z+)d, ‖x‖1 ≤ n, ‖x′‖1 ≤ n and ‖x− x′‖1 ≥ cn,
∃i ∈ [k] : |F (x)i − F (x′)i| ≥ c · θ
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Using the hypothesis i.e.,
∀i [|M(x, F )i − F (x)i| = o(θ)]
Hence, we get that (for all x′ such that ‖x− x′‖1 ≥ cn)
∃i ∈ [k] : |M(x, F )i − F (x′)i| = Ω(θ)
This shows that algorithm B will never return x′ if ‖x − x′‖1 ≥ cn and hence the correctness is
proven.
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A Construction of databases with large differences
In this section, we give constructions of sets of vectors in (Z+)d (in other words, sets of databases)
which were used in the results in Section 2.
Claim A.1 There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any d ∈ N, 0 < ǫ < 1 and log d ≤ k ≤
d/C, there is an integer a ≥ (log(d/k)/160ǫ) such that it is possible to construct 2k/20 vectors
x1, . . . , x2k/20 ∈ Z+d with the following properties :
• Every entry of xi is either 0 or a
• ∀i, ‖xi‖1 ≤ k/80ǫ and ‖xi − xj‖1 ≥ k/160ǫ
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Proof: We use construction of combinatorial designs from [Pau85, RRV99]. Namely, the main
theorem in [Pau85] states that it is possible to construct sets S1, . . . , Sm ⊆ [d] with the following
properties :
• ∀i, |Si| = ℓ
• ∀i 6= j, |Si ∩ Sj| ≤ ρ
provided d ≥ C ′ · ℓ2·m1/ρρ for some large constant C ′. We now see that if we put ℓ = ⌊k/ log(d/k)⌋,
ρ = ℓ/4 and m = 2k/20, then indeed d ≥ C ′ · ℓ2·m1/ρρ provided C is sufficiently large compared to
C ′.
Now, consider the set A = {y1, . . . , y2k/20} be the characteristic vectors of the sets S1, . . . , S2k/20 .
Now, we observe that setting xi = ⌊(log(d/k)/80ǫ)⌋ · yi achieves all the stated conditions.
Claim A.2 For any d, d′ ∈ N, d′ ≤ d and 1/40 ≥ ǫ > 0, n = d′/(4ǫ), there exists S ⊆ Z+d such
that the following conditions hold:
• ∀x ∈ S, ‖x‖1 ≤ n
• ∀x, y ∈ S and x 6= y, ‖x− y‖1 ≥ n/10
• |S| ≥ 24d′/5
Proof: Consider a set C ⊆ {0, 1}d with the following two properties.
• |C| ≥ 24d′/5
• ∀x, y ∈ C, x 6= y, ‖x− y‖1 ≥ d′/9
• ∀x ∈ C, ‖x‖1 ≤ d′.
Such a set C exists. To see this, consider an error correction code C ′ ⊆ {0, 1}d′ with distance d′/9
and rate 4/5. Such a code exists via probabilistic method. Now, the set C is constructed as
C = {x ≡ y ◦ 0d−d′ : y ∈ C ′}
Now, consider the set S ∈ Z+d such that
S = {x : x = ⌊(1/4ǫ)⌋ · z and z ∈ C}
We claim that the set S satisfies the required conditions. The first and the third parts of claim
are obvious. Note that for any x, y ∈ S, ‖x − y‖1 ≥ (d′/9) · ⌊(1/4ǫ)⌋ ≥ d′/(40ǫ) ≥ n/10. The
penultimate inequality uses that (1/4ǫ) ≥ 10.
The above claim worked for ǫ < 1. We now prove a claim which works in the regime of ǫ > 1.
Claim A.3 There exists C > 0 such that for any d, d′ ∈ N, ǫ > 1 and d′ ≤ d/(C ·25ǫ) , n = d′/(4ǫ),
there exists S ⊆ Z+d such that the following conditions hold:
• ∀x ∈ S, ‖x‖1 ≤ n
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• ∀x, y ∈ S and x 6= y, ‖x− y‖1 ≥ n/10
• |S| ≥ 24d′/5
Further, S is in fact a subset of {0, 1}d.
Proof: We observe that the construction of set S is related to the construction of combinatorial
designs [Pau85, RRV99] with specific parameters. In particular, the result in [Pau85] allows us to
construct sets S1, . . . , Sm ⊆ [d] with the following properties :
• ∀i, |Si| ≤ ⌊n⌋
• ∀i 6= j, |Si ∩ Sj| ≤ ρ ≤ ⌊4n/5⌋
• m ≥ 24d′/5
provided that d ≥ C′·n2·m1/ρρ (for some large constant C ′). Using the conditions on d, d′ and n,
we see that the condition is satisfied provided C is sufficiently large compared to C ′. Clearly, if
x1, . . . , xm are characteristic vectors of the sets S1, . . . , Sm respectively, then
S = {x1, . . . , xm}
satisfies the conditions of our claim.
B Large deviation of Rademacher sums from their mean
In this section, we prove the following inequality which says that Rademacher sums have large
deviations from their mean with significant probability.
Theorem B.1 Let x1, . . . , xd be i.i.d. ±1 random variables such that E[xi] = 0. Also, let a1, . . . , ad ∈
R
+ such that
∑d
i=1 ai = n. Then, for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ n/2,
P
x1,...,xd
[∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
i=1
aixi
∣∣∣∣∣ > θ
]
≥ exp
(−2dθ2
n2
)
An immediate application of the above theorem is the following corollary.
Corollary B.2 Let x1, . . . , xd be i.i.d. ±1 random variables such that E[xi] = 0. Also, let
a1, . . . , ad ∈ R+ such that
∑n
i=1 ai = n. Then,
P
x1,...,xd
[∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
i=1
aixi
∣∣∣∣∣ > n10√d
]
≥ 9
10
To prove Theorem B.1, we use the following result due to Montgomery-Smith [MS90]. For y ∈ Rn
and t > 0, we define
K(y, t) = inf
y′∈Rn
{‖y − y′‖1 + t‖y′‖2}
The following theorem about large deviation of Rademacher sums from the mean was proven by
Montgomery-Smith [MS90].
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Theorem B.3 Let x1, . . . , xd be i.i.d. ±1 random variables such that E[xi] = 0. Then,
P
x1,...,xd
[∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
yixi
∣∣∣∣∣ > K(y, t)
]
≥ exp(−t2/2)
To use Theorem B.3 in order to prove the Theorem B.1, we make the following claim.
Claim B.4 Let y ∈ Rd such that ‖y‖1 = n. Then, K(y, t) > min{n/2, nt/(2
√
d)}.
Proof: Note that K(y, t) = infy′∈Rn{‖y−y′‖1+ t‖y′‖2}. Consider y′ which achieves the infimum.
If ‖y′‖2 ≥ n/(2
√
d), then we are done. Else, we get that ‖y′‖1 ≤ n/2 (by Cauchy - Schwarz). Then
by triangle inequality, we get that ‖y − y′‖1 ≥ n/2.
The theorem immediately follows by plugging the lower bound on K(y, t) from the above claim in
Theorem B.3.
C Concentration of measure for the sum of squares of Gaussians
In this section, we prove a result about the concentration of measure for the sum of squares of i.i.d.
N (0, σ) random variables. While this seems to be a well studied distribution in literature, we could
not find a usable result on its concentration and hence we prove the following theorem here.
Theorem C.1 Let X1, . . . ,Xk be k i.i.d. N (0, σ) random variables. Then,
P
X1,...,Xk
[X21 +X
2
2 + . . .+X
2
k > 2(1 + η)kσ
2] ≤ 2−ηk2
Proof: Note that by definition, for any i ∈ [k],
P[Xi = t] =
√
1
2πσ2
e−
t2
2σ2 dt
Then, consider the random variable Zi = exp
(
X2i
4σ2
)
. We note that
E[Zi] =
∫ ∞
−∞
√
1
2πσ2
e−
t2
2σ2 · e t
2
4σ2 dt =
∫ ∞
−∞
√
1
2πσ2
e−
t2
4σ2 dt =
√
2
Now, observe that
P
X1,...,Xk
[X21 +X
2
2 + . . .+X
2
k > λ] = P
X1,...,Xk
[
X21 +X
2
2 + . . .+X
2
k
4σ2
>
λ
4σ2
]
= P
X1,...,Xk
[
exp
(
X21 +X
2
2 + . . .+X
2
k
4σ2
)
> exp
(
λ
4σ2
)]
≤
(
E
X1,...,Xk
exp
(
X21 +X
2
2 + . . .+X
2
k
4σ2
))
/ exp
(
λ
4σ2
)
Using independence of the Xi’s, we get that the above expression is∏k
i=1
(
E exp
(
X2i
4σ2
))
exp
(
λ
4σ2
) = ∏ki=1 E[Zi]
exp
(
λ
4σ2
) = 2k/2
exp
(
λ
4σ2
)
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Putting λ = 2(1 + η)kσ2, we get that the above expression is
2k/2
exp
(
λ
4σ2
) = 2k/2
exp
(
2(1+η)kσ2
4σ2
) ≤ 2k/2
2
(1+η)k
2
≤ 2− ηk2
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